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Alternative Hypotheses and the Volume of Trade:  the Gravity 
Equation and the Extent of Specialization 
 
 
Jon Haveman       David Hummels 





Abstract:   We examine why the gravity equation works and the implications for its use.  There 
are three contributions.  First, we demonstrate that the gravity equation as a statistical 
relationship (and not as a specific prediction about bilateral trade) can be generated from a model 
with incomplete specialization.   Second, we analyze two facts or “puzzles” that are broadly 
inconsistent with the complete specialization models typically used to derive the gravity 
equation.  In both cases, the data are consistent with the alternative hypothesis of incomplete 
specialization.  “Home bias”, for example, is only puzzling when viewed through the lens of the 
complete specialization model.  Third, we demonstrate that the explanation for why the gravity 
equation works has considerable relevance for how the gravity equation is interpreted and used, 
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I.  Introduction  
 
The gravity model is one of the most commonly used devices in empirical trade research.  
Literally scores of studies employing gravity equations have appeared in the literature, with considerably 
increased use of late.  The reason for this use is summed up in leading surveys of empirical evidence on 
international trade theory.  Deardorff (1984) writes that gravity models are “extremely successful 
empirically” judging by their ability to explain variance in bilateral trade volumes.  Leamer and 
Levinsohn (1997) write that gravity models “have produced some of the clearest and most robust 
empirical findings in economics.”  
 In its most common use, the gravity model provides a baseline against which to measure 
deviations from “normal” or frictionless bilateral trade.  Three recent and prominent examples include 
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), who measure the effects of regional trading blocs, McCallum (1995) who 
measures the effect of international borders and the existence of “home bias”, and Wei (1998), who 
measures the effect of exchange rate variability on trade patterns.1   
The theoretical motivation for the framework is found in a set of general equilibrium models that 
derive specific predictions for bilateral trade.  Examples include Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), 
Deardorff (1998), and Helpman and Krugman (1985).    The common elements in each of these papers are 
complete specialization and identical preferences; each good is produced in only one country and 
consumers value and therefore purchase every good.   
More recently, the fit of the gravity equation has been used as a test of monopolistic competition 
trade theory. Harrigan (1993) estimates a unitary elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to exporter 
output, as predicted by the theory.  Helpman (1987) notes that the model predicts greater trade when 
countries are more similar in size, and suggests that trade growth within the OECD may be caused by size 
convergence over time.   Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) show that this property also holds for non-
OECD countries with little intra-industry trade. They interpret this as evidence that the fit of the simple 
gravity equation may be due to something other than trade in differentiated goods.  A possible answer to 
this puzzle may be found in the work of Anderson (1979) and Deardorff (1998).2  Both employ models 
characterized by complete specialization in production and derive the gravity equation without assuming 
monopolistic competition.  As Grossman (1998) notes, the key to generating gravity predictions is 
complete specialization itself, and not the particular details on the supply-side that give rise to it.  
A consensus appears to have formed around this position – the fit of the gravity equation suggests 
that production is extremely specialized, even if it does not inform us as to the source of that 
                                                        
1 This is a very abbreviated list of correlates; others include shipping costs, tariff rates, product standards, 
information costs, exchange rate regimes, migration, political uncertainty, insecurity, and internet penetration. 
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specialization.  If correct, this is a powerful insight into the nature of trade, as well as a highly useful 
insight for empirical work.  Complete specialization models provide precise structural predictions for 
bilateral trade that can be taken directly to the data.  In the context of the model the baseline value for 
bilateral trade is very well defined, and deviations from that baseline have direct and specific meaning in 
both a positive and normative context.  For example, the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to a tariff 
increase maps directly into a key parameter in the underlying utility function, and the resulting quantity 
change has a direct interpretation in terms of lost utility.3 
The constrast with models that do not assume complete specialization is stark.  The canon of 
neoclassical models is generally characterized by incomplete specialization (each homogeneous good is 
produced by more than one country).  With more than two countries such models say little about the 
pattern of bilateral trade other than predicting the set of partners with which a country may trade.  The 
reason for this neglect is that the bilateral pattern of trade is difficult to resolve.  If there are multiple 
producers of an identical good willing to sell at the same price, importers will be indifferent between them 
and bilateral trade is indeterminate.  In this case, there is no baseline value for bilateral trade, and no sense 
in which the bilateral pattern is tied to any question of normative importance.  With smallish trade barriers 
importers will not be indifferent – they will purchase goods from whoever is the low cost supplier into 
their market.  Rough intuition thus suggests that whatever these models might have to say about bilateral 
trade there is no reason to suppose it at all resembles the gravity equation. 
 This paper asks three questions.  One, can we derive the gravity equation under incomplete rather 
than complete specialization models?  Two, can we find corollary evidence suggesting that incomplete 
rather than complete specialization might explain the success of the gravity equation?  Three, does it 
matter why the gravity equation works? 
After reviewing the trade volume predictions of complete specialization models in Section II, the 
contribution of this paper is contained in three main sections.  Section III analyzes a simple neoclassical 
trade model with incomplete specialization in order to identify trade volume predictions that are similar to 
or different from the complete specialization model.   We provide multilateral trade volume predictions in 
a general setting and use world endowment data to simulate a multi-country Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) 
version of the model.   The model yields insights regarding the income elasticity of trade that are very 
similar to the complete specialization model, but predicts a much lower level of trade.  If trade is costless, 
then bilateral trade is indeterminate in this model.  However, trade is not costless in the world, and we 
resolve the indeterminacy by letting importers chose partners in such a way as to minimize transportation 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2 See also Evenett and Keller (1998) and Jensen (2000). 
3 See Lai and Trefler (1999). 
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costs.  This resolution yields (as a statistical relationship) bilateral trade in proportion to partner incomes, 
also known as the gravity equation.     
 Having demonstrated where the models are similar, we turn to the question of where they are 
different.  We ask:  if both complete and incomplete specialization models yield the gravity equation, can 
we identify corollary evidence that is consistent with only one of these models?  Section IV analyzes 
evidence on trade in varieties and the level of trade.  The complete specialization model used to derive the 
gravity equation implies that consumers highly value variety, importing all goods that are produced.  In 
contrast, the incomplete specialization model suggests that importers will buy from only a small fraction 
of available sources, strongly consistent with the data.   Second, the complete specialization model 
predicts trade levels much higher than incomplete specialization models, and much higher than we 
observe or can explain with observable barriers.  In each instance, the data suggest that the complete 
specialization model used to explicitly derive the gravity equation considerably overstates either the 
extent of specialization (the degree to which goods are differentiated) or the degree to which consumers 
value that differentiation.   
Previous authors have derived the gravity equation under a variety of assumptions, so simply 
adding another model to the list is of limited consequence.  A case must be made that the explanation for 
why the gravity equation works has considerable relevance for how the gravity equation is interpreted and 
used, and how we view bilateral trade.  In Section V, we examine the positive interpretation and 
normative content of gravity regressions under complete and incomplete specialization.   Section VI 
concludes. 
  
II.  The Null Hypothesis: Complete Specialization 
  
  We begin by examining predictions about the volume of trade in what we term complete 
specialization (CS) models.  These models have at their core two common assumptions: production is 
completely specialized (only one exporter produces each good), and importers purchase all goods. The 
familiar monopolistic competition framework with CES utility is one such model, though its virtue is that 
complete specialization is derived rather than assumed.4  
 To show the central role these assumptions play, we provide the following simple model that is 
closely related to Anderson (1979). We assume all goods are final goods, that trade is balanced, and there 
is no international lending.  With identical and homothetic preferences, and assuming no trade barriers, 
each country i will consume an income share, kb , of good k, or  
                                                        
4 With the CES utility structure, consumers demand all varieties and producers always produce unique varieties in 
order to have monopoly power over that variety. 
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(1) k ki iC b Y=   
 
World output of good k, kwX , must equal world consumption, so summing purchases of good k over all 
countries, k kw llX b Y= Â .  Solving for kb  and substituting into equation (1) we find that i consumes its 
world income share ( /i i ws Y Y= ) of world production of good k.   
(2) k ki i wC s X=    
By assumption, production is completely specialized.  That is, every country is the sole supplier of the 
goods that it produces, or k kw jX X= .  As a result, the consumption vector directly pins down the pattern 
of bilateral imports of good k as  
(3) k k kij i w i jM s X s X= =  
Country i will demand a similar fraction of all the goods produced in country j.  Summing over all 
sectors, and noting that the sum of sectoral output equals national income in j, we arrive at a prediction 
for bilateral trade:  





= =Â  
This equation is known as the simple or frictionless gravity model.  
  Complete specialization models also provide straightforward predictions about the multilateral 
volume of trade. Sum equation (4) over all partner countries for a particular importer,  
(5) (1 )i i iM Y s= -  
This multilateral model provides a baseline prediction for the level of trade, and an implication that the 
trade share of income (M/Y) is decreasing in income.  
  For several exercises, we wish to evaluate the predictions of the model in the presence of trade 
barriers. This requires a specific form of the model and a specific assumption about utility.  We employ 
the most common form of the complete specialization framework, a one-sector model in which firms are 
monopolistically competitive and produce differentiated varieties that enter a CES utility function as 
follows.  
( )( )1/i ijjU c qq= Â  
where Cij denotes consumption in importer i of a variety j, 1 1/q s= - , and σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between goods. An important benefit of this model is that it provides a flexible way to 
evaluate implied trade barriers over a range of substitutability between goods.  
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  As the trade volume predictions in this model are well known, we do not repeat the derivation 










where Yj is output from exporter j, 1ijt ≥  is the ad-valorem trade barrier, j ijp t is the price of the good 
inclusive of all transactions costs, and iP  is a CES price index over all available goods.  
  This model contains four predictions that we wish to highlight and then compare to an alternative 
hypothesis of incomplete specialization.  The first two predictions concern the income elasticity of trade.  
One, the gravity equation captured in equations (4) and (6) predicts a unitary elasticity of bilateral trade 
with respect to the product of partner incomes. Two, equation (5) predicts that the elasticity of multilateral 
trade with respect to income is less than one -- that small countries trade a larger fraction of income than 
do large countries.  
  The third prediction concerns the level of trade.  Absent trade costs, equation (5) predicts 
multilateral trade equal to 90 percent of income for a country with 10 percent of world GDP.  With trade 
barriers, equation (6), trade may be considerably lower depending on the size of the barrier and the 
elasticity of substitution.  The fourth prediction concerns which countries trade.  Equation (3) indicates 
that if a country produces a good, all other countries purchase it.  Note that this is true even in the 
presence of (finite) iceberg transport costs.5   
 
III.  The Alternative Hypothesis:  Incomplete Specialization 
 
The models used to derive the gravity equation as a specific and determinate prediction for 
bilateral trade have at their core the assumption of complete specialization – each good is produced in 
only one country.  In this section we examine a model with incomplete specialization (multiple countries 
may produce each homogeneous good).  This is not an esoteric choice of models to examine – the 
canonical models of neoclassical trade theory including Heckscher-Ohlin, Ricardian, and Specific Factors 
models commonly exhibit incomplete specialization.   
Our goal is to examine the income elasticity of trade, the level of trade, and the number of 
partners from which a country imports a particular good using the most general possible setting.  In some 
cases we will require a more specific formulation to make specific predictions and here we employ a 
simple 2 good, 2 factor, N country Heckscher-Ohlin world to illustrate model properties.  The point here 
                                                        
5 Equation (6) implies that, with finite trade barriers and finite substitution elasticity, all varieties are purchased. 
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is not to set up a horse race, but rather to illuminate which predictions are unique to complete or to 
incomplete specialization and which predictions are shared. 
 
III.1 Multilateral Trade 
  We begin by using a simple accounting exercise to derive the multilateral volume of trade in the 
presence of incomplete specialization.  As above we assume away intermediate goods, and note that 
national output X and national income Y must be equal.  Define kjg  as the output share of good k in 
country j, so that country j's output of good k is 
 
 k k kj j j j jX X Yg g= = .  
As in the previous model, identical and homothetic preferences ensure that every country consumes its 
world income share of each consumption good.  
k k
j j wC s X=  
An accounting identity expresses the volume of exports in a sector as production less consumption, or  
( ) ( )
k
k k k k k kw
j j j j w j j j j
w
X
EX Y s X Y Y b
X
g g g= - = - = -  
where bk is the share of good k in world consumption (production).  Summing over those sectors with 








= -Â  
The volume of exports depends on the income of the country and the trade share of income (the 
summation term).  The trade share of income can also be thought of as a measure of the extent of 
specialization - the difference between what a country produces and the average of world production.  
  For example, assume goods production is completely specialized (one exporter per good) as in 
the previous section.  First rewrite equation (7) as  
(8) 
exp
(1 ) ( )k kj j j j r
k
X Y s g g
Œ
= - -Â  
where subscript r denotes rest-of-world.  Since each country is the sole supplier of its export good, 






=Â . This simplifies to yield the 
predicted trade level from the complete specialization model, equation (5).  It also makes clear that trade 
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levels are maximized under complete specialization.6 In the more general case of incomplete 
specialization (when 0krγ ≠  in (8)), we expect much lower trade volumes.   This is the first major result 
of this section:  observed trade levels look low relative to a model that predicts the maximum possible 
volume of trade.   
  Equation (7) also provides insights into the elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income.  
Suppose that in a cross-country sample the extent of specialization is uncorrelated with incomes. 
,
exp




- =Â  
That is, output shares do not differ from world production averages to a greater degree in large countries.  
In this case, the measured elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income is one.  This is true 
regardless of the details of why countries specialize.  In a statistical sense, the supply-side details of the 
model are a disturbance around an accounting baseline.  This baseline says simply:  other things equal, 
large countries trade more.  
 
III.2  The Textbook Case:  2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin 
  Since (7) was derived using only an accounting identity and a common assumption on 
preferences it is independent of issues such as the number of goods, factors, or countries, whether 
production is characterized by increasing or constant returns to scale, or whether cross-country 
heterogeneity is due to factor endowments, technology, or goods differentiation. However, since it is only 
an accounting identity it has limited economic content.  Next we examine equation (7) in the context of a 
familiar model.  
 We employ the textbook 2 goods, 2 factors Heckscher-Ohlin model, which we analyze in a many 
country context.  In this model, the level of trade and the elasticity of trade with respect to income depend 
on the distribution of the capital-labor ratio (k). Larger endowment differences (i.e., increasing 
i i wkdif k k= - ) yield greater specialization in country i and more trade.7  The estimated elasticity of 
trade with respect to income depends on the sample covariance of kdif and Y.   If large and small countries 
have endowments that are equally far from the world endowment, then the extent of specialization given 
by endowments is uncorrelated with incomes.  In this case, the elasticity of trade with respect to income is 
one.  However, if large countries have endowments i wk k=  and only small countries differ from the 
world endowment, in our cross-country sample we will observe that trade is decreasing in incomes.  
                                                        
6 Of course, one can specify preferences to exceed trade volumes predicted by a model of complete specialization 
and identical homothetic preferences.  In the limiting case, country A produces only good 1, and consumes only 
good 2.  Country B produces only good 2, and consumes only good 1, yielding trade/GDP =1. 
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  In short, the HO model contains no theoretical presumptions for the extent of specialization, the 
level of trade, or the income elasticity of trade that are independent of the country distribution of k and Y.  
A sensible exercise in this case is to check world endowments and examine predictions about trade given 
the observed distributions. We assume taste and technology parameters, and using data on k and Y, we 
generate predicted values for trade in a 2x2xN country HO model.  Details on the model solution are 
provided in an appendix, and summarized here.  
  Preferences are Cobb-Douglas with equal expenditure shares on both goods.  We employ the 
standard assumption of infinitesimal trade barriers operating at the border. This ensures that countries will 
first satisfy domestic consumption demands with domestic production before turning to foreign sources of 
supply.  Production is Cobb-Douglas for the two goods.  
1
1Z K L
a a-=   12Z K La a-=  
We experiment with the parameters, varying α from 0.55 to 0.95.  Data on k and Y come from World 
Bank sources and cover 96 countries in 1990.  As there are large differences across countries in the 
fraction of output devoted to traded goods, we employ non-service sector GDP in place of total GDP.8 
The numerical model solves for the output of both goods in each country, and the vectors of multilateral 
imports and exports.  Bilateral patterns are left to the following section.  
  The numerical model generates trade levels between 20 and 40 percent of output.9  This is in the 
range of trade shares observed for most countries.  The exercise provides a useful illustration that trade 
levels resembling actual data can be generated by the most common textbook model with no trade 
barriers. Section IV draws a contrast between this result and the size of trade barriers necessary to 
reconcile complete specialization models with actual trade levels.  
  Next we estimate the elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income generated by the 
numerical HO model, both with and without endowment data as a control.   
 
(9) 1ln lni i ijM a Yβ ε= + +  
 
(10) 1 2ln lni i i ijM a Y kldifβ β ε= + + +  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
7 However, once all countries are outside of the diversification cone and producing only their export goods, 
increasing factor dissimilarity does not affect specialization or trade volumes. 
8 This requires the following additional assumptions. One, the income share spent on services is exogenous. Two, 
factor usage in the service sector is identical to the national K/L ratio in each country.  While these are strong 
assumptions, the results we present are very similar when using total GDP in the numerical model.  
9 Trade levels vary inversely with α. Small values of α imply that countries heavily specialize in their export good 
and export more. 
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In Table 1, we report estimates using data from the α = .75 case.10  For contrast, we also report estimates 
employing actual multilateral trade data from the Statistics Canada World Trade Database.  
 Cross-section estimates on the HO model, omitting endowments, show elasticities close to, but 
slightly less than, one.  Thus, the numerical HO model provides the same insight as the complete 
specialization model – while the level of trade is greater in large countries, small countries trade a larger 
share of income.  In the HO model this is explained by the actual distribution of k and Y.  Endowments of 
small countries deviate from the world endowment to a slightly greater extent than large countries.  As a 
consequence, small countries are more extensively specialized, but the effect is not so important that their 
level of trade is greater.  Note that, as equation (7) predicts, when we include the endowment data in the 
regression we cannot reject a unitary income elasticity. 
 
III.3 Bilateral Trade and the Gravity Model 
 Neoclassical models with incomplete specialization and more than two countries say little about 
bilateral trade, other than predicting the set of partners with which a country may trade.  The first reason 
for this neglect is that the bilateral pattern of trade is difficult to resolve.  If there are multiple producers 
of an identical good willing to sell at the same price, importers will be indifferent between them and 
bilateral trade is indeterminate.  This is the second reason for the neglect of bilateral patterns – if 
importers are truly indifferent to partner selection, researchers should be indifferent as well.  That is to 
say, if bilateral volumes resist positive description and their resolution is a matter of no consequence from 
a normative standpoint, why bother? 
However, pure indeterminacy is a problem more relevant to theoretical exercises than to 
empirical applications.  Even with multiple suppliers of homogeneous goods, in the real world trade will 
not be literally indeterminate, as variation in trade costs will quickly sort out bilateral pairings.  To 
address this more empirically relevant case, we experiment with a model in which trade costs resolve the 
bilateral trade pattern.11 We examine whether the trade patterns that arise from this model mimic the 
gravity equation, in the sense that bilateral trade is proportional to the product of partner incomes.  
Suppose trade barriers are rising in distance so that importers of homogeneous goods buy only 
from the closest, and therefore cheapest, source of supply. This resolves the indeterminacy, but at the cost 
of an exceptionally complicated equilibrium (location-specific prices for each good). To avoid this 
problem, we allow bilateral trade costs to become arbitrarily small while retaining the cost ranking of 
partners. Then equilibrium prices are unaffected, but bilateral indeterminacy is resolved. This is 
fundamentally the same method used in neoclassical models to resolve indeterminacy between home and 
                                                        
10 Results are qualitatively similar for other parameter values. 
11 We thank Jim Harrigan and Don Davis for this suggestion. 
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foreign sources of supply. Rather than assuming an arbitrarily small barrier operating at national borders, 
we assume an arbitrarily small bilateral barrier that is rising in distance.   
Of course, this model provides an immediate departure from an important prediction of the 
complete specialization models used to derive the gravity equation.  Importers do not value multiple 
sources of homogeneous goods, and so will not buy goods from every available supplier.  Instead, 
importers shift purchases to the low-cost supplier(s).12 
This model differs substantially from an earlier examination of bilateral trade under incomplete 
specialization.  Deardorff (1998) analyzes a model in which trade is frictionless and all producers sell at 
the same price.13  To resolve indeterminancy, Deardorff employs a particular probability model. Let all 
production be placed into a common world pool from which bilateral trade is allocated, one dollar at a 
time. To allocate this trade unit we randomly select an exporter and an importer, with selection 
probabilities given by their shares of the world pool, i.e., exporter j and importer i are chosen with 
probabilities /j j wP Y Y=   and  /i i wP Y Y=  so that the expected probability of an ij match for any one 
draw is given by 2/ij i j wP YY Y= .  With wY draws, the expected number of times a particular pair is chosen 
(and the volume of trade) is the simple, or frictionless gravity equation.  ( ) /ij i j wE M YY Y=  
This is an interesting theoretical point but the approach has limited application.   First, it is 
equivalent to showing the gravity equation holds by assuming the gravity equation holds – the resolution 
is not unique, and different random matching models generate different outcomes that are equally 
“likely”.  Indeed, given indeterminacy any resolution of bilateral trade is acceptable so long as adding up 
constraints are met.  Second, the model is extremely sensitive to the inclusion of trade barriers – even 
infinitesimally small barriers invalidate the prediction.  As such it is uniquely unqualified to motivate the 
use of the gravity equation for measuring trade barriers, and after all, this is one of the principle uses to 
which gravity equations are put.  Finally, we note that the Deardorff model predictions regarding the level 
of trade and numbers of exporters from whom an exporter buys are identical to the complete 
specialization model without barriers.  We show in the next section that the data strongly reject these 
predictions. 
To complete the analysis, we employ the 2x2xN numerical HO model from the previous section 
with data on k and Y drawn from world endowments. The model generates vectors of output and 
multilateral trade for each country, and determines the set of partners with which a country may trade.  
                                                        
12 There will not necessarily be a single low cost supplier.  Limao and Venables (1999) develop an analytical model 
with the properties of our current setup.  Importers buy from multiple sellers, all of whom sell at the same (cif) price, 
but they do not buy from all available sellers. 
13 Evenett and Keller (1998) also examine incomplete specialization, but restrict themselves to a two-country case. 
As a result, bilateral trade is identical to multilateral trade and is therefore well determined in the model. 
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We then resolve indeterminacy in bilateral trade using the “minimum distance” rule.  This yields a 
bilateral trade matrix for the numerical HO model that can be compared both to real bilateral data and to 
the prediction of the complete specialization model.  
 We estimate the simple gravity equation in cross-section using data generated from the numerical 
HO model and real bilateral trade data.  For the HO model data we also include the variable kldif for both 
the importer and exporter. When examining real data, equation (6) implies that trade barriers influence 
trade volumes, and their omission may affect the estimated elasticity.  To address this problem, we follow 
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) in estimating the relationship in a panel with yearly data from 1970-1992 
and including country pair fixed effects and year dummies.14  This sweeps out time-invariant, pair-
specific trade barriers, as well as pair-invariant, time specific trade barriers.  This is our preferred 
specification as it controls for a long list of plausibly important omitted variables, enabling a cleaner 
examination of the income elasticity.  The three estimating equations are: 
 
(11) 1ln lnij i j ijM a YYβ ε= + +  
 
(12) 1 2 3ln lnij i j i j ijM a YY kldif kldifβ β β ε= + + + +  
 
(13) 1ln lnijt it jt ij t ijM a Y Y c yr eβ= + + + +  
 
We report the results in Table 2.  A strict test that 1 1β=  can be rejected in all regressions, 
including those employing real data, but a looser null that 1 0β>  cannot be rejected.   Note that the 
coefficients generated from the HO model are not significantly different from those estimated using panel 
techniques on real data.  
In our HO model two things resolve the bilateral pattern of trade.  Relative endowments 
determine the set of partners with which a country may trade, and relative distance determines which of 
that set will be chosen.  Partner income plays no role in the theoretical model.  Why then do partner 
incomes enter significantly in the empirical model?   
The simple intuition is that the bilateral trade matrix is governed by a set of adding up constraints.  
When summing country i's imports over all sources, one must get back i’s multilateral volume of imports, 
and similarly for country j's exports.  For any particular importer, the trade pattern may be unrelated to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
. 
14 These results are very similar when using either five year or ten-year intervals instead of annual data, and results 
are very similar when we exclude year dummies altogether. 
 13
size of exporters’ shipments.  But some country must buy the goods of large exporters.  On average, 
bilateral shipments involving countries that export a great deal must exceed the bilateral shipments 
involving countries that export very little.  
The evidence in Table 1 then allows us to connect this intuition back to partner incomes, as 
opposed to multilateral trade volumes.  There we showed that the HO model (given world data on k and 
Y) predicts a tight relationship between country size and the level of trade. This suggests that incomes 
operate as a good proxy for the multilateral import and export terms.  That is, incomes predict multilateral 
trade, and multilateral trade is related to bilateral trade mechanically through adding up constraints. In this 
sense the model generates a statistical or “on-average” relationship between bilateral trade and incomes.  
This is very different from a model prediction linking the two variables, as we detail in Section V.  
A few notes on robustness are in order.  First, we have not proven that every allocation of 
bilateral trade must look like the gravity equation.15  However, we have experimented with using many 
different barrier types (tariffs, NTB’s, shipping costs) to resolve bilateral indeterminacy in the manner of 
the “minimum distance” rule used above, and all deliver quite similar results.  Second, our argument 
clearly turns on the elasticity of multilateral trade with respect to income.  Under the HO model version of 
our alternative hypothesis this elasticity depends in turn on the distribution of endowments and incomes.  
As a result it is easy to generate examples in which multilateral trade (and therefore bilateral trade) is 
unrelated to, or negatively related to, incomes.  Thus it is not true that, as Deardorff (1998) conjectures, 
“almost any model” will fit the gravity equation.  It just happens that endowments and income in the 
world are distributed in such a way that the HO model does generate the gravity relationship. 
 It should be emphasized that we have focused entirely on patterns that are revealed through 
bilateral trade volume regressions.  This ignores which countries a nation trades with and how the models 
stack up in that regard.    It is well known that 2x2 HO models cannot explain north-north trade, though 
recent work by Davis (1997) shows that higher dimensional models can.  Our argument goes through for 
higher dimensions so long as the extent of specialization is not strongly negatively correlated with 
incomes. In this case we would match the determinants and level of trade volumes, while also resolving 
the north-north problem.16  
 
 
                                                        
15 In previous drafts we have experimented with a wide variety of rules for randomly determining the bilateral trade 
pattern under indeterminacy and all yield something like the Table 2 results.  This is clearly not a proof that every 
allocation under indeterminacy will work.  However, since trade costs undoubtedly resolve indeterminacy in the real 
world, worrying about possible outcomes under indeterminacy seems a sterile pursuit.   
16 We have not attempted this calibration because we lack data on the finely differentiated factor supplies that 
motivate Davis' argument for higher dimensions. 
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IV.  Corollary Evidence 
 
 The previous sections suggest that the income elasticities of multilateral and bilateral trade look 
quite similar when derived from models with complete specialization and those with incomplete 
specialization.  In this section we examine model predictions that are dissimilar.  These two predictions 
concern “corners” or zero values in the bilateral trade matrix, and the overall level of trade.  The complete 
specialization models used to derive the gravity regression have very particular predictions that differ 
substantially from the incomplete specialization model we have described.  We do not intend this look at 
the data as a “test” of one model over another, but rather a broad check of the consistency of the complete 
specialization explanation for gravity regressions.  We show that data patterns that appear as “puzzles” to 
be explained in the context of complete specialization models may not be puzzles at all if the world is 
incompletely specialized. 
 
III.1 Zero Values in the Bilateral Trade Matrix   
 Can we find direct evidence in trade data that production is completely specialized (only one 
country produces each good)?  One possibility is that goods production is completely specialized at the 
precise level of aggregation at which we chose to examine trade data.  In this case, we should see only 
one producer for each product code. A second possibility is that goods production is completely 
specialized at much more disaggregated levels than we are able to measure.  (This includes “varieties” of 
goods, as in the monopolistic competition model.) In this case, we might observe many producers within 
a single product code. Aggregation issues thus preclude a direct investigation as to whether production is 
completely specialized.  
However, by restricting our attention to the complete specialization models used to derive the 
gravity equation, a fundamental implication is observable.  These models assume that production is 
completely specialized and that all products (varieties) are valued and purchased by all consumers.17  We 
examine the equation (3) implication that if a country exports a good to at least one country, it will export 
that good to all countries.18  
  Figure 1 provides evidence on this point. We define a “good” as a 4-digit SITC category. Using 
1990 bilateral trade data from the Statistics Canada World Trade Database (WTDB) we calculate the 
number of exporters in each good, with the count frequency displayed at the top of Figure 1.  The median 
                                                        
17  We acknowledge the contribution of referees who have pointed out that this implication is not a perfectly general 
implication of all complete specialization models with identical preferences.  This is addressed below. 
18 Previous authors have noted the existence of zero values in the trade matrix, but this is generally acknowledged in 
the context of motivating proper econometric technique to handle zero values.  We are unaware of work that uses 
the existence of zero values as evidence on the nature of specialization. 
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number of suppliers in each category is 81.  For each importer and good we calculate the number of 
exporters from whom the importer purchases that good. We then express this as a ratio over the total 
number of exporters in that good. If an importer does not purchase a good from any exporter, the ratio is 
zero.  Complete specialization models used to derive the gravity equation predict that the ratio should be 
one for all goods and countries.   Using four-digit SITC level we have 173 countries and 438 4-digit 
sectors, for 75774 total data points.   
The message of Figure 1 is clear.  Countries do not buy all available goods, as zero values (no 
imports from any source of that good) represent fully 27 percent of the distribution. Conditional on 
importing the good from at least one exporter, countries buy from very few exporters. In 58 percent of 
these cases, importers buy from fewer than 10 percent of available exporters, and in 99.4 percent of the 
cases fewer than half of the available varieties purchased.  Considering only rich (OECD) countries or 
only manufactured goods, the ratio increases but the distribution remains bunched much closer to zero 
than to one.19  This data pattern is not unique to this year or this dataset.  A very similar pattern can be 
found in the World Trade Database for every year from 1970-1997.  UN COMTRADE data from 1962-
1983 evaluated at the 4 and 5 digit SITC level exhibits the same pattern but to an even greater degree – in 
eighty percent of observations importers buy from fewer than 10 percent of available suppliers. 
  Of course, the model captured in equation (3) may not apply to all goods or all countries.  It is 
therefore unsurprising to find some values less than one. The surprising thing is that in none of the 75,774 
cases does an importer avail itself of all varieties.  While the median number of suppliers in a good is 81, 
the modal value for number of partners with which a country trades a particular good is zero; conditional 
on buying from someone, the modal value is one.  
 This rejection is made more striking by the fact that our data examination is biased in favor of 
complete specialization models used to generate the gravity equation.  Strictly speaking, equation (3) 
implies that if a country produces a good, all other countries import it.  These data cannot identify cases 
in which countries produce (but fail to export) certain goods.20    Also, we cannot identify the full breadth 
of varieties available from an exporter.  There are many car models produced in the US, but we can only 
determine if at least one model is purchased. While we have no direct evidence on the full set of varieties 
produced, we suspect that the fraction of available varieties that are actually imported is even lower than 
the figure suggests.21  
                                                        
19 Over the whole sample, importers buy from a median of 4 percent of exporters; for the OECD importers only it is 
25 percent; for manufactures over all importers, 7.4 percent; for manufactured imports into the OECD, 29 percent.  
20 This would require a comprehensive and detailed set of production data and existing sources, such as the OECD 
COMTAP or STAN databases, are too aggregated and too limited in geographic scope to be of use. 
21 This conjecture is supported by calculations performed at the one-, two-, and three-digit level. Higher levels of 
aggregation pull the distribution further to the right, though even for very broad categories it is clear that importers 
buy only a fraction of available varieties. 
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  What models would deliver Figure 1?  In the most common formulation of the section II model, 
preferences are CES over varieties of goods, and monopolistically competitive firms produce unique, 
differentiated, varieties in order to charge markups. Introducing non-infinite iceberg transport costs to this 
model will diminish trade, but never force it to zero.22 
  To generate the data pattern in the figure requires a model in which importers do not consume 
every variety.   Consider several examples.  First, if there are multiple producers of a good that consumers 
regard as homogeneous, they will buy only from the low cost exporter.   Thus, our alternative hypothesis 
of incomplete specialization can be used to reconcile a decidedly inconvenient fact from the complete 
specialization framework used to derive gravity equations. 
 Figure 1 can be reconciled with a complete specialization model coupled with some reason that 
consumers value and purchase only a subset of available varieties.  For example, with preferences as in 
Lancaster (1979), importers only value and therefore will purchase a small number of “ideal” varieties.   
Even if the utility function exhibits some “love of variety”, the presence of fixed costs of trade (see 
Romer (1994) and Klenow and Rodriguez (1998) for two examples) or declining marginal utility of 
varieties (see Ottaviano, et al. (1999)) will cause importers to buy only a handful of varieties.  
 Clearly then, we cannot reject these other hypotheses as explanations for the Figure 1 result, and 
indeed they seem like sensible directions to pursue.23  However, their implications for trade volumes and 
for the pattern of bilateral trade differ markedly from the simple world captured in the Section II model.  
For example, in a model with fixed costs of trade, larger countries are willing to pay the fixed costs for a 
greater set of varieties and therefore trade more as a fraction of income than do small countries.  This 
exactly reverses the implication of equation (5).  And with zeros, the bilateral pattern of trade becomes 
very difficult to resolve, and in in many cases indeterminate.  Absent some heterogeneity, the model 
implies that importers buy a subset of available varieties, but not which varieties.24  Put another way, 
while it may be possible to reconcile Figure 1 with a modified “love of variety” preference formulation, it 
is much more difficult to reconcile the zero values with the model used to generate the gravity equation. 
   
III.2 The Level of Trade 
 Beginning with McCallum (1995), a number of authors have used gravity regressions to reveal a 
significant puzzle in international economics regarding the level of trade.  The key idea is to estimate (6) 
                                                        
22 One could argue that finite costs might diminish trade to the point that is observably zero, that is, below levels 
captured by trade statistics.  If so, the zeros should be predictable in the sense that estimating the model with OLS on 
positive values should predict trade values extremely close to zero for all observed zeros. We have experimented 
with this and found that, for most observed zeros, the model predicts positive values of trade greater than the 
threshhold value at which trade statistics are reported.   
23 We regard an investigation into partner selection, largely ignored to this point, as a promising method for learning 
about the nature of differentiation and trade barriers.  See Haveman, et al. (1999) for an example. 
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treating domestic purchases as one of many bilateral “trade” options, and to include a dummy variable to 
indicate domestic purchases.  These studies find large border effects – domestic purchases are many times 
larger than foreign purchases.  The implication usually drawn is that international borders appear 
remarkably closed to trade.  We argue here that trade levels are only puzzlingly low when evaluated in the 
context of a particular model of complete specialization.  We briefly compare these model predictions to 
the data, and then turn to incomplete specialization as an alternative hypothesis for the “puzzle”. 
Equations (4) and (6) provide predictions for the level of trade with and without trade barriers. 
We provide calculations showing how large barriers must be in order for the model with trade barriers to 
generate actual trade levels.25  Suppose that the price of imported goods inclusive of ad-valorem barriers 
is constant over all external sources.26 Using equation (6), we can then express the ratio of internal over 
external purchases (all imports, r) as  
(14) 
1
ii i r ir
ir i i ii
M s p t
M s p t
sÊ ˆ= Á ˜- Ë ¯  
/(1 )i iS s s∫ -  is the predicted value of internal to external purchases provided that internal and external 
prices are equal. We observe S and /ii irM M M∫ . Given values for σ, we can solve for the ratio of 
internal to external transactions costs implied by purchases. We provide calculations using aggregate 
trade data and use non-service sector gross output to construct the income share terms, is .
27 Multilateral 
imports are constructed from the WTDB.  Internal purchases are non-service sector gross output less 
multilateral exports.   
  The first column of Table 3 reports M, the observed ratio of internal to external purchases, for 19 
countries. The second column reports S, the predicted value of internal to external purchases under the 
assumption that internal and external prices are equal. The third column is M/S, and shows that the 
observed ratio of internal to external purchases is anywhere from 13 to 2000 times larger than what is 
predicted under the equal transactions cost case.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
24 See Klenow and Rodriguez (1998). 
25 We eschew the typical approach of estimating a gravity regression with border dummies for several reasons.  One, 
the model implies particular elasticities for the income terms and we impose rather than estimate these elasticities.  
Two, estimation runs into a host of measurement problems that we avoid.  For example, differences in measures of 
internal distance (how far is a country from itself?), the treatment of proxy variables like language and adjacency, 
and the manner in which the CES price index is handled all seem to dramatically affect estimates. 
26 This approach assumes there is little bilateral variation in transactions costs over external sources. This is 
precisely what gravity model-based studies imply.  Border effects are many times larger than effects associated with 
exporter-varying barriers such as distance, language, or adjacency.  
27 To get non-service sector gross output, we use World Bank data to construct non-service sector GDP, then 
multiply by the gross output to value-added ratios found in Wei (1996).  The difference between value added and 
gross-output is not a problem in the construction of income shares so long as the the ratio is similar for the importer 
and the world. 
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 Several authors (Wei, 1996; Evans 1999) have noted that, in the context of this model, trade 
levels may be low because transactions costs are high or because the elasticity of substitution is high.  In 
short, if σ is a free parameter it can be chosen to match any trade level given any transactions cost.  How 
then can we use the level of trade to generate any inferences about the validity of the complete 
specialization model?  Simply, σ is not a free parameter and can be identified by how bilateral import 
quantities respond to relative price variation. 
  Two recent papers that assume a complete specialization framework (in particular, monopolistic 
competition) and use aggregate bilateral trade data provide helpful estimates. Hummels (1999) uses the 
coefficient on the distance term from an aggregate gravity regression along with the technological 
relationship between freight and distance to identify σ and finds elasticities in the range of 2.2 to 4.6.  
Baier and Bergstrand (1999) relate time series variation in aggregate freight and tariff barriers to trade 
growth in a gravity framework and identify σ =6.28   Based on these estimates we use a value of σ =5 to 
interpret the trade data.  
The third column of Table 3 can also be interpreted as the ratio of external to internal prices 
implied by trade flows in the σ=1 case. Exponentiating values in this column by (1/ σ) yields the price 
ratio for higher substitution elasticities.  The US is, according to this model, the most open to trade. 
External transactions costs raise the price of imported goods by only (!) 68 percent relative to domestic 
goods. Elsewhere, imported goods are from 2 to 4 times more expensive than domestic goods.  A 
comparison to measurable trade barriers is useful here. US import data for 1994 indicate that aggregate 
expenditures on tariffs and transportation costs for imported goods are approximately 6 percent ad-
valorem. 
  What conclusion do we draw from this exercise?  Given evidence on the elasticity of 
substitution, complete specialization models predict extremely high trade levels.  When filtering evidence 
on actual trade levels through these models, one must conclude that national borders are extremely costly 
barriers to surmount.  While introspection and the size of measurable barriers suggest this interpretation is 
in error, we cannot formally reject it without knowing precisely what trade costs borders pose.  Perhaps 
some enormous yet difficult to measure barrier looms at national borders.  
  Another interpretation is that borders pose a moderate barrier to trade and that complete 
specialization models dramatically over-predict trade volumes.  The home bias literature assumes that the 
frictionless gravity equation (4) accurately predicts the trade volume that would prevail were barriers non-
existent.  And as the previous section shows, that model provides the limiting case for maximal trade 
flows given identical preferences.  Models with incomplete specialization predict much lower trade 
                                                        
28 Estimates on sector level data yield higher elasticity estimates, on the order of 7 to 8.  See Hummels (1999). 
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volumes, and our 2x2 HO model employing world data on endowments and incomes generates trade 
volumes that are on the order of those observed in the world.29   In that model domestic demands are first 
met by domestic supplies when both home and foreign producers manufacture the same good.  This can 
be justified by very small border costs.     
  
V.  Implications:  Does it Matter Why the Gravity Equation Works? 
  
Previous authors have shown that the gravity equation can be derived from any number of 
underlying models, so simply adding another model to the list is of limited consequence.  A case must be 
made that the explanation for why the gravity equation works has some relevance for how the gravity 
equation is interpreted and used, and how we view bilateral trade.   
 The most immediate implication is seen in the previous section.  Viewed through the lens of 
complete specialization models used to derive the gravity equation, both the level of trade and the 
existence of zeros in the bilateral trade matrix are significant puzzles.  Much ink has been spilt trying to 
understand why home bias appears to so strongly characterize trade flows.  Under the alternative 
hypothesis, there is no puzzle.  
 
V.1 Normative Implications of Bilateral Trade 
 The normative consequences of deviations from the gravity equation prediction for trade differ 
considerably under the complete and incomplete specialization models.  Under complete specialization, 
the gravity equation is not merely a positive description of bilateral trade; it has normative content as 
well.  Consider the most common version of the model that proceeds from CES preferences and is 
captured in equation (6).   It is a straightforward exercise to evaluate the utility function using observed 
trade quantities.  In this model deviations in bilateral trade from the predicted baseline result in direct and 
quantifiable welfare losses.30   
The normative implications under incomplete specialization are quite different.  As we argue in 
the previous section, indeterminacy may result from a world of costless trade precisely because importers 
are indifferent to multiple sources of supply.  However this trade is arranged, whether it looks country 
pair by country pair exactly like the frictionless gravity equation as Deardorff suggests it may, or whether 
it deviates wildly from this benchmark, it simply does not affect welfare.  In the case where 
indeterminacy is resolved via trade barriers, Table 2 indicates that something like the gravity equation 
appears to hold as a kind of “on-average” statistical relationship.  Yet many country pairs will exhibit 
                                                        
29 Another possibility is that fixed costs of trade prevent some firms from exporting.  See Evans (2000). 
30 See Lai and Trefler (1999). 
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trade looking nothing at all like equation (6), and many of these values will be zero, a prediction 
confirmed for the real world by the data in Figure 1.  Still, bilateral deviations that leave net supplies and 
terms of trade unchanged are of no normative consequence because under the alternative hypothesis, 
importers do not attach any value to multiple sources of supply.  They care only for purchasing the goods 
from the low cost supplier.    
A particular example of this logic can be seen in the debate over regional trade agreements.  
Krugman (1991) models the welfare gains from regional versus multilateral integration in a monopolistic 
competition framework, and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) implement the model empirically using a 
gravity regression.  One basic insight is that regional agreements can be costly relative to multilateral 
liberalization because consumers value distinct varieties produced outside the bloc.  Indeed, as Deardorff 
and Stern (1994) note, trade diversion must exist in this model because all outside varieties are distinct 
and valued.  They show that the welfare consequences are very different in a neoclassical model in which 
the goods produced inside the bloc are identical to those produced outside the bloc.  Here regional 
integration may not be costly precisely because there is no value to purchasing the homogeneous good 
from multiple sources. 
 
V.2  Evidence on the Nature and Extent of Specialization 
Several authors have examined the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to partner incomes 
hoping to generate inferences regarding the nature of specialization.  Our findings on incomplete 
specialization provide some insight into this literature. 
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) find that a variant of the gravity model works well even for non-
OECD countries whose trade does not appear well described by monopolistic competition.  One response 
is to suggest, in the vein of Anderson (1979) and Deardorff (1998), that these countries trade goods whose 
production is completely specialized (though this inference is problematic given the importance of 
commonly produced bulk commodities in the trade of the non-OECD countries that Hummels and 
Levinsohn examine).  An alternative response inspired by Table 2 is that it matters little whether these 
countries trade completely or incompletely specialized goods.  Something like the gravity equation would 
have worked in any case. 
 DeBaere (1999) suggests that the broad success of the gravity equation, and a resolution of the 
Hummels and Levinsohn puzzle can be found in the particular specification employed.  Denoting the sum 
of partner’s income as ( ij i jY Y Y= + ), we can rewrite the simple gravity equation as 
2 2( )[1 ( / ) ( / ) ]ij ij i ij j ijM Y Y Y Y Y= − − .   
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The income sum is a scaling term and the term in the square bracket is a measure of size dispersion that 
takes on maximal value when the countries are of equal size. DeBaere claims (but does not derive 
formally) that bilateral trade volumes will be correlated with the scaling term in any trade model whereas 
the size dispersion term will affect bilateral trade only under complete specialization (monopolistic 
competition).31   
Employing DeBaere’s formulation and using the data from the HO numerical model in which 
bilateral trade is resolved with the minimum distance rule, we estimate 
 
2 2ln( / ) 6.87 7.8 ln(1 ( / ) ( / ) )
2 .49
ij ij i ij j ij ijM Y Y Y Y Y
R




With a t-stat of 14, we find that size dispersion remains an important determinant of bilateral trade even 
under the HO model, thereby rejecting DeBaere’s inference. 
Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1999) estimate a gravity relationship on disaggregated trade data 
as a test of a reciprocal dumping model.  They find income coefficients significantly less than one for 
estimates involving reference priced commodity groups, and take this as evidence for the dumping model.  
An alternative explanation for these results is that the reference priced commodities are best described by 
the HO model (that is, homogeneous goods produced under perfect competition).  Our results suggest 
income coefficients for trade involving these goods will be positive, but less than one. 
Finally, our results provide some insights into the extent of specialization, in that gravity 
equations cannot be regarded as arising only from complete specialization and that corollary evidence 
(zeros, trade levels) is highly problematic for complete specialization models.  We liken the insights to 
research provided by Don Davis (1995, 1997) into the existence of intra-industry trade, and the large 
volume of bilateral trade between similar countries. A narrow reading indicates that both facts are 
inconsistent with the simplest neoclassical models, and suggests the need for models (such as 
monopolistic competition) that can explain these facts. However, Davis shows that extensions of 
neoclassical models can explain both intra-industry and north-north trade. The point is not that simple 
neoclassical models are wrong, or that new trade theory models are unnecessary. Instead, the exercise 
helps us to identify which features of models are important for explaining trade patterns. 
In this vein, we recognize that models with complete specialization are a critical component of 
our empirical and theoretical toolkits.  Yet, our facts on trade levels and variety trade indicate something 
                                                        
31 Hummels and Levinsohn estimate this equation as a product of these two terms, whereas Debaere moves the 
scaling term to the left hand side.  His result is that size dispersion is significant for trade within OECD countries but 
not for trade outside the OECD.   
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is amiss with these models.   In each case the data suggest that the complete specialization model 
considerably overstates either the extent of specialization (the degree to which goods are differentiated) or 
the degree to which consumers value that differentiation.  Even if we are unwilling to go as far as the 
incomplete specialization framework suggested as an alternative here, these data should provoke 
significant amendments so that the basic models conform to the included facts.   
  
V.3 Coefficient estimates – consistency under the alternative hypothesis 
The gravity equation is most commonly employed as a simple device for describing trade, and 
identifying correlates.  What do our results say about this basic enterprise?  Recall that, under the 
alternative hypothesis, multilateral trade and bilateral trade are mechanically linked through an adding up 
constraint while variables such as national incomes merely operate as good proxies for multilateral trade.   
That is, national incomes and capital/labor differences explain multilateral trade, not bilateral trade.  
Because these variables may be noisy proxies for the true variable of interest, they are subject to the usual 
errors in variables problem.   Attenuation biases their coefficients toward zero, with the bias growing 
worse as the proxies get noisier.   
To show this property we alter the endowment data from our HO model so that the variable 
i i wkdif k k= - , varies over countries i in a way that is uncorrelated with incomes iY  (i.e., on average, 
large and small countries have endowments that are equally far from the world endowment).  We re-solve 
the model for output and multilateral trade levels in each of our 96 countries, and estimate the income 
elasticity of multilateral trade in the manner of equation (9).  With this setup, the estimated elasticity is 
one, but the relationship between trade and income is noisy.  The amount of noise is described by the 
regression R2 from estimating equation (9).  We repeat this exercise 50 times, varying kldif but holding 
cov(kldif,Y)=0 so that the estimated multilateral income elasticity remains one.  The R2’s for the 50 draws 
are plotted on the horizontal axis in Figure 2. 
Using the data generated from the HO model, we then distribute bilateral trade using the 
minimum distance algorithm and estimate a bilateral gravity equation in the manner of equation (11).  
The income coefficient from that regression is plotted on the vertical axis of Figure 2.  This is done 
separately for each of the 50 draws.  With multiple draws we generate a relationship between how noisy 
income is as a proxy for multilateral trade and the resulting bilateral income coefficients.   Figure 2 shows 
that a noisier relationship between multilateral trade and income result in a stronger downward bias on 
gravity equation estimates, even though the mechanism for allocating bilateral trade remains constant.   
  We have focused on incomes for simplicity, but under the alternative hypothesis, the insights 
apply more generally.  It is easy to generate examples where variables such as per capita incomes, 
capital/labor ratios, and MFN tariff levels only affect multilateral trade directly.  However, they enter into 
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bilateral regressions as proxies.  As with the income example just shown, the noisier proxies will enter 
with downward biased coefficients. 
 
IV.4  Interpreting Regression Fit 
Finally, much ado is made about the high R2s of gravity regressions.32  This can be thought of in 
two ways.  One, the included variables explain trade “well”.  Two, the model is a useful baseline in the 
sense that it controls for many things that matter so we need worry less about what is omitted.33  In this 
section we examine the assertion that the gravity model “fits the data well” under the null and alternative 
hypotheses.   
The key to the analysis is a model-based approach to measuring regression fit in which we 
calculate the ad-valorem equivalent of the residuals.34  Suppose that the null hypothesis of equation (6) is 
exactly correct so that if we have a complete characterization of trade barriers, t, we will estimate the 
model with no error. However, in practice we do not know t exactly, and variation in trade volumes due to 
this omission shows up in the residuals.  Interpreting the residuals as missing components of t, we 
calculate from them the unexplained variation in trade barriers associated with unexplained variation in 
trade volumes.35  
 More formally, represent ijt  in (6) as 0 1 2ln ln lnij ij ij ij ijt DIST LANG ADJδ δ δ τ= + + +  
where distance, language, and adjacency are common correlates used in gravity regressions, and ijτ  is the 
ad-valorem equivalent of the unobserved barrier.  This is estimated by 
 
(15) 1 0 1 2ln ln lnij i j ij ij ij ijM a YY D DIST D LANG D ADJ eβ= + + + + +  
 
Using equation (6) we note that the size of the barrier implied by the residual is exp( / )ij ijeτ σ= −  while 
the ad-valorem equivalent of the included variables can be similarly discerned ( /n nDδ σ= ).   This 
                                                        
32 This sentiment is clear in several leading surveys of empirical evidence on international trade theory.  Deardorff 
(1984) writes that gravity models are “extremely successful empirically” as witnessed by the variance explained, 
while Leamer and Levinsohn (1997) write that gravity models “have produced some of the clearest and most robust 
empirical findings in economics.”  McCallum’s (1995) famous piece on national borders justifies the use of the 
gravity equation entirely by citing Deardorff’s quote.   
33 Wei (1998), a well-known application that uses the gravity model to assess the effect of exchange rate variability 
on trade, argues for using the gravity model on the grounds that it outperforms factor endowment models in an R2 
sense, and that adding factor endowment terms to a gravity specification does little to improve fit. 
34 This technique is closely related to a calculation done by Hummels (1999).  See Leamer (1988) for a calculation 
involving a factor endowments model that is similar in spirit. 
35 Of course, for this to be exactly correct, the unobserved barriers must be uncorrelated with the included 
regressors. 
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interpretation of the residual underscores the limited content of traditional measures of regression fit 
focused on unexplained variation in trade volumes. Suppose there are two states of the world, a high σ 
state and a low σ state, and that trade patterns are identical in both cases. With identical trade patterns, a 
regression R2 will yield the same measure of model fit in both states. However, in the high σ world, the 
residuals correspond to relatively small unobserved trade barriers, i.e., whatever is left does not much 
affect prices. 
We estimate (15) using all (aggregate) bilateral trade flows reported in StatCan World Trade 
Database in 1990.  We estimate the constant and the income terms rather than directly imposing values 
consistent with equation (6). This abstracts from concerns about the level of trade and allows us to focus 
entirely on the bilateral distribution of trade.36  We also omit country pairs with zero trade values, as 
implied trade barriers must be infinitely large to explain a zero trade in this model.  Note that both of 
these corrections make the residuals look much smaller than would be the case in an estimate strictly 
guided by the underlying theory. 
 
ln 13.9 .9ln 1.03ln .56 .63
2 .62 9083 2.2
ij i j ij ij ij ijM YY DIST LANG ADJ e
R obs RMSE




All included variables are significant at the 1% level.  For each i,j pair there is a unique residual 
so we characterize the average unmeasured barrier as the root mean squared error of the regression.  At 
σ=5 (the preferred value from Section III.2) the RMSE is equivalent to a 55 percent tariff, while speaking 
a different language raises costs by 11 percent, sharing a border lowers costs by 12 percent, and 
increasing distance by one standard deviation above the mean (a 9 percent increase) increases costs by 
(1.03/5)* 0.09=1.8 percent ad-valorem.   The ad-valorem equivalent of the regression error is large both 
absolutely and relative to the other barriers (more than twice as large as the combined effect of 
traditionally included variables).   Suppose we reject the literature’s estimate of σ and claim a much 
higher value.  This would lower the ad-valorem equivalent of the residual in absolute terms.  However, it 
would not change the importance of the residual relative to the included barriers, as all are proportional to 
σ.   
 What do we conclude from this exercise?  Under the null hypothesis of complete specialization 
captured in equation (6), the interpretation is that we have identified a few variables that are robustly 
correlated with trade volumes, but we simply have not done an adequate job of explaining barriers.   Of 
course, our barrier list is far from comprehensive and the model might fare much better with explicit 
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measures of tariffs and transport costs (not to mention the relative price terms).  But the simple form 
estimated here is very common in the literature, and generally hailed as providing a good explanation of 
the data.  This interpretation is not sustainable, even under the null.  
 Under the alternative hypothesis of incomplete specialization, the interpretation is different.  As 
goods become perfect substitutes, importers concern themselves only with relative prices.  In this case, 
minute changes in trade barriers may generate enormous changes in bilateral trade volumes as importers 
shift to the low cost supplier.    The implication is that the “missing barriers” captured by the residual, as 
well as the included barriers (distance, language, adjacency) may be quite small.  To put this in the 
language of the null model, let σ go to infinity and evaluate the ad-valorem equivalents of 
exp( / )ij ijeτ σ= −  and /n nDδ σ= .   
 Even if we are only concerned with a positive description of bilateral trade flows, this implication 
is troubling.  The interpretation under the alternative hypothesis suggests a considerable role for “noise” 
that may not yield to economic analysis, as small and difficult to measure price changes may swamp other 
effects. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
There are three main contributions.  First, we demonstrate that the gravity equation as a statistical 
relationship (and not as a specific prediction about bilateral trade) can be generated from a model with 
incomplete specialization.   Second, we analyze two facts or “puzzles” that are broadly inconsistent with 
the complete specialization models typically used to derive the gravity equation.  In both cases, the data 
are consistent with the alternative hypothesis of incomplete specialization.  “Home bias”, for example, is 
only puzzling when viewed through the lens of the complete specialization model.  Third, we demonstrate 
that the explanation for why the gravity equation works has considerable relevance for how the gravity 
equation is interpreted and used, and how we view bilateral trade. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
36 We have already shown in Section III.2 that the level of actual trade is much lower than is predicted by the 
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Appendix A – Simulation Methodology 
 
In the text, multilateral trade flows are generated in a 2x2xn numerical Heckscher-Ohlin model.  The 
solution technique for this model is discussed in this appendix. 














and experiment with the parameters, varying α from 0.55 to 0.95. Preferences are also Cobb-Douglas, with equal 
expenditure shares on each good.  Using our assumptions on taste and technology, and using data on endowments, 
we solve for the output and multilateral volume of trade in both goods for each country. 
 In order to determine the output of each good in each country, we need to determine the relative factor use 
for each good.  For countries outside of the cone of diversification, this is trivial.  For countries inside the cone of 
diversification, factor intensities are determined from the following two equations: 
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These are two equations in three variables, 1 2 1
1 2 1




.   
 
Discovering the equilibrium values of all three variables is then a matter of searching over prices for that 
corresponding to factor intensities resulting in balanced world trade. The algorithm that determines equilibrium 
prices is one that searches over prices for those that equalize world imports and exports of both goods.  The 
algorithm proceeds as follows.  First, pick some relative prices of the final goods, the ratio of the world capital 
supply to the world labor supply is generally used here.  For a given price ratio, the equations above uniquely 
determine the borders of the cone of diversification, the labor-capital ratios used in the production of the two goods 
by countries that do not specialize.  Within the cone of diversification, the supply of labor and capital to each 
industry can determined from full employment conditions on the factor endowments, and noting that the factor 
usage will be identical to the factor usage that define the cone.  If trade does not balance for the chosen price vector, 
the relative price of the good in excess demand rises, and the algorithm is repeated until trade is balanced. 
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R2 from Multilateral Trade Regression 
Figure 2:  Attenuation Bias under Alternative Hypothesis 
Real data




R2 0.83 0.92 0.93
N 96 96 96
ln Yi Yj 0.57 0.66 0.9 0.61





R2 0.62 0.69 0.51 0.48









Australia 4.37 0.013 334.0 3.20
Austria 2.77 0.008 328.8 3.19
Canada 2.30 0.025 90.7 2.46
Denmark 1.60 0.006 255.3 3.03
Finland 3.54 0.005 771.4 3.78
France 3.27 0.063 51.8 2.20
Germany 2.36 0.089 26.6 1.93
Italy 6.47 0.058 111.9 2.57
Japan 16.60 0.202 82.1 2.41
Mexico 4.43 0.015 298.5 3.13
Netherlands 1.37 0.015 93.0 2.48
New Zealand 3.67 0.002 2037.1 4.59
Norway 1.49 0.005 298.9 3.13
Portugal 3.27 0.004 847.2 3.85
Spain 5.14 0.026 194.3 2.87
Sweden 3.22 0.011 293.0 3.11
Switzerland 1.94 0.012 168.7 2.79
UK 2.79 0.050 56.2 2.24
US 5.01 0.370 13.6 1.68
Ratio of external to 




The Level of Trade
Table 3 
